by Miné Salkin | Oct 6, 2008 | Uncategorized
Despite the efforts of UBC’s student activist and political issues groups to raise awareness of the upcoming elections, the resounding message is still “apathy,” said key student activists.
Co-founder of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and a well-known student activist, Nathan Crompton says that a lot of students at UBC are apathetic towards politics in general due to heavy workloads and the increasing stress of student debt.
Crompton cites Conservative government policies as part of the culprit for the fact that an average of six out of 10 students in British Columbia are either engaged in part time of full time work, and the typical student graduates with $25,000 worth of debt.
“A certain percentage of the population of the student body who have a certain level of privilege are happy with the way things are in the world, more or less, are satisfied with existing conditions,” he said, accounting for some of the apathy with respect to electoral issues.
NDP Vancouver Centre candidate Michael Byers capitalized on these sentiments in a debate in front of UBC students, criticizing the Conservatives’ post-secondary education fund policies. “This is a system for the rich, for the privileged, for the people who are born with silver spoons in their mouth,” he told a group of nearly 100 students who were amassed at the UBC Student Union Building (SUB) on Sept. 25, as many of them showed their support.
Byers asked how many students presently were working while going to school, and nearly half of the group raised their hands. Byers’ speech on post-secondary funding sparked the approval of all of these students, who were also asked whether or not they depended heavily on student loans and wished they could spend less time working and more time focusing on their academic studies.
Despite the enthusiasm for Byers’ support and the number of electoral events on campus, VP of Student Services Rodrigo Ferrari Nunes says that most politicians in both the municipal and federal elections are almost indistinguishable from one another for many students. “As for the federal election, I am still trying to get used to the candidates,” he says.
rodrigo proudly shows off the controversial gss handbook
Liberal party leader Stéphane Dion was invited by the BC Young Liberals, and the open debate in the SUB was hosted by students of the AMS External, showing the need for students to access politicians directly in order for their questions to be answered.
Interdisciplinary PhD student and member of the SDS, Edward Lee Durgan says that the electoral events on campus were all initiated, coordinated and promoted by students, rather than the political parties directly. “I don’t think the elections are geared towards students,” he said.
When discussing the truth that so many students decide remain apathetic to politics, Durgan said that the candidates and party leaders depend on this kind of willful disengagement. “I think the major political parties count on that, the disenfranchisement or marginalization of that part of the population, and that’s just that many fewer people that they have to influence somehow,” he said.
by Miné Salkin | Mar 4, 2008 | Uncategorized
Notoriously complicated and oblique in content and form, G.F Hegel’s work on the topic of history is one that inspires much philosophical and historical curiosity. Indeed, many elements of the Hegelian phenomenological theory of history point to various conclusions on the nature of history itself, yet unlike many other models of historical interpretation it devotes itself entirely to the study of human consciousness as the sole indicator of human historical activity. As this paper elucidates, Hegel’s marriage between philosophy and history is an inexorable one; as human beings are capable of rational and retrospective thought we create an irresistible and infinite series of syntheses from the past into the present. For the most part, the assumption of moral progress, or change is expected as the typical historical outcome, yet as Hegel’s phenomenological view of history explores, the notion of human progress is but a myth: rather than evolution, human beings throughout history merely change, and create paradigmatic shifts in collective consciousness which cannot be measured by moral or any other human tools of progress.
While the study of human history may be largely viewed as an interpretive, subjective arena of study, Hegel asserts that the phenomenological reality of world history is an empirical-type reality, and the phenomenological apparatus is but the “continuum with historical consciousness,”an actuality that can be affirmed by logic. The axiom of history encompasses the development, then subsequent realization of the Spirit’s consciousness of freedom. According to Hegel, “freedom develops itself into a world and leads us directly to the phenomenon of history,” which is the fundamental relation between human consciousness and the historical realization of it as a phenomenon which transcends and lives with the Idea, or the truly essential. A philosophical approach to history is crucial in our understanding of human beings, as it emphasizes the dialectic within which forgetting, recollecting and subjugation together synthesize the totality of historical thoughts from the past into the present.
In other words, the phenomenological goal is to universally synthesize all aspects of human consciousness, regardless of their historical time and place, and to achieve a dialectical reconciliation with an ultimate form of self-consciousness and actuality.
One of Hegel’s central issues in The Phenomenology is the notion of human progress as evidenced by the process of understanding history. According to the doctrine of inevitable progress, many analyses of Hegel’s work falsely point to the conceivability of history as a strictly purposive movement forward. However, and as George Dennis O’Brien points out, the direction is dialectical and circular: “the spirit of a People is a natural individual; as such it blossoms forth, is strong, declines and dies… in the realm of the spirit there is essential change and progress.”
This passage elucidates the distinction between natural change and the human world which is made intelligible by the dialectical process of history; for Hegel, history cannot be understood as the progress of a natural species but rather the intellectual movements within the historical process itself.
Similarly, in Van der Dussen’s analysis of Collingwood’s approach to history, Collingwood’s philosophy of history bears some dialectical resemblance with Hegel’s view of the world spirit, and the notion of moral progress. Dussen writes that “history is concerned not with ‘events’ but with ‘processes’; that ‘processes’ are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another.”
In this way, many of the problems of history arise from the misconception that there is some form of idealism in the past which is attainable, but in actuality the past is not an objective reality – rather it is an intrinsic relation to the historian. This notion is furthered by Collingwood and Hegel’s shared idea that moral progress cannot be appropriately fleshed out by historical thought as it pertains to an idealistic, ethical outlook on human nature. Dussen notes the similarity between Hegel and Collingwood on this matter and writes that “societal progress is associated with institutional progress… Part of our moral life consists of coping with problems arising not out of our animal nature but out of our social institutions, and these are historical things, which create moral problems only in so far as they are already the expression of moral ideals.”
Rather than looking to history as a documentation of human moral evolution, Hegel and Collingwood’s theory of history as a process illustrates the point of contingency in relation to matters of morality; as new ideas of morality replace the old it is impossible to pass judgement on the common consciousness and belief system which held the old beliefs in place.
Futhermore, the Collingwoodian view of memory supports Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of world history as he argues that history has an implicitly synthetical structure consisting in memory, freedom, and knowledge. While many historical textbooks may focus on specific events, dates, or places of historical interest, Hegel’s view of history as an organic, dialectical synthesis of the past and present is a far more convincing model of our pluralistic universe. Collingwood shares this view of the synthesis of human intellect, as Dussen points out that an historical series is much like Hegel’s dialectic: “For mind in general… this accumulation is called experience; for consciousness, it is called memory; for a social unity, it is called tradition; for knowledge, it is called history.”
One should note that the use of the word ‘mind’ is interchangeable with ‘spirit’ – a concept which both writers allude to heavily in the discussion of historical process and progress. In other words, the historical process of accumulating world spirit and past ideas is fundamental in our pursuit of understanding our present historical stage, as the present is dialectically contingent on the ideas and past historical memory. Van der Dussen illustrates this point very clearly by making the philosophical links between Collingwood’s views on human progress as an unattainable ideal notion through history with Hegel’s conception of the dialectic as a medium of recollecting past knowledge in order to further our understanding of the present.
According to Hegel, this may be established through a collective synthesis of iconoclastic, revolutionary or widespread dogmas which typify historical epochs. As O’Brien succinctly writes: “the passion which moves history is a passion to possess the freedom of others…. sprit – self-consciousness – reason.”
Since history is highly reflexive, individual, and dependent on self-consciousness, Hegel believes that this can be realized as zeigeist, or the spirit of the time. Zeitgeist is essentially an anthropomorphic construction of a world historical individual: culture heroes who impress their passion, individuality and ideas upon a society. According to Hegel, only these people possess the passion to inspire historical revolution and change, and eventually influence the structure of the State, which is the object of world history. Hegel describes how the historical world individual fits into the dialectic of the historical process which in turn clarifies the object of history itself. The interest of Reason in its absolute form, compounded by passion and self-reflexivity altogether create the organic totality which is the sum of zeigeist: “the product of the world historical individual is in turn something uniquely individual: a people… the aim of history, the end of historical making is the spiritual individual… the definite object of world history proper.”
Thus while a clear understanding of contemporary views of human nature are imperative within the historical dialectic which Hegel puts forth, it does not necessitate some conception of progress of moral evaluation as part of the historical process in turn. Rather than witnessing the historical process as some evolutionary transformation, Hegel’s dialectic posits a view of this process as one which is based on human understanding and cyclical-type shifts in collective thought.
John H. Nota disagrees very strongly with this assertion, and claims that Hegel’s view of history is based on a purely rational conception of human progress. While the general form of the dialectic is thesis-antithesis-synthesis, Nota claims that the world spirit can only be realized within this dialectic if and only if “strife” exists. He explains that zeigeist reacts to a “preman,” or some form of adversity, and only this conflict can substantiate the dialectic in order to realize the “being-in-and-for-itself of the spirit in complete freedom.”
While Nota clearly explains the historical process and mechanisms of the historical dialectic, the claim that strife is a necessary condition is unnecessary. While the master-slave dialectic has been appropriated by Marxist, materialistic interpretations, Hegel’s historical dialectic differs because it is based on the process, not the actuality of historical knowledge. In other words, it is the being-in-and-for-itself of the spirit which actualizes history, not an actual historical event.
Similarly, Hegel’s notion of the historical world individual indifferently refers to the the Idea which is determined as freedom, or the Idea of freedom. Joseph McCarney invokes a similar idea in relation to the mechanics of the historical dialectic, but asserts that the same strife which perpetuates the machine of history. Using an analogous metaphor of building a house, McCarney discusses the scope of cunning of reason which the world historical individual embodies. He writes that the historical dialectic of reason, passion and change is the same active process of house-building, in that the cunning of reason in relation to the Idea of freedom is to create “as much darkness as light,”
which suggests the notion of an independent, purposive, and transcendent subject in relation to history. Such is the role of freedom, according to Hegel, as it is the freedom of the world historical individual who relates the Idea and passions which in turn influences and modifies the spirit of the people.
However, one should note that Hegel’s conception of freedom is far more complicated and vast in scope, particularly in relation to the topic of world history. At a causal level, Hegel’s notion of freedom in relation to history is falsely construed; if history is non-empirical and deterministic according to the inevitable forces of the dialect, then it logically follows that freedom is not purely metaphysical either. While physical laws may necessarily exist, the history of human beings is restricted to an epistemological, strictly mind-related study. On the other hand, Hegel’s interest in the dialectic and the role of the zeitgeist is arguably the negation of such supposed freedom: “the great events, the major social changes… they are caused and indeed necessitated; they are the effects of vast impersonal forces in the face of which the individual is powerless.”
While Hegel’s conception of freedom ostensibly offers an alternative solution to the problems of human beings existing in an universe governed by necessary laws, there is a contradiction within this very notion of freedom and its relation to the world historical individual, as it appears as if these fluxes for historical change are inevitable socializing forces.
Daniel Berthold-Bond makes a similar complaint, and asserts that Hegel’s dialectic necessarily lends itself to a cosmological, eschatological end of the world. This is realized by his interpretation of the dialectic as a self-referential model of progress, where the end of one age signifies the beginning of another epoch in world history. He sets up this argument by establishing what he considers to be a significant point of ambiguity within Hegel’s notion of the end product of the dialectic. While Hegel alludes to a grand scheme of self-realization, self-actualization and the reconciliation of the world’s spirit through the synthesis of the past and the present, Berthold-Bond notes that this idea suggests a final end, a conclusion or completion in history. He describes how Christian times are emblematic of this relation between the dialectic and its end, and claims that the meaning of world history becomes fulfilled against itself, embodied by Jesus himself. The following passage reveals Berthold-Bond’s position entirely, and is worth quoting at length:
“…there is no historical hope for man, but that the redemption and salvation of man will occur at the End of history, or “beyond history” – that Hegel’s vision of the consummation of the Christian telos departs. For Hegel, God’s revelation is intrinsically historical. Hence “the history of the world,… the process of development and realization of spirit, is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history… He is manifest and revealed in the course of human history.”
In his phenomenology, Hegel refers to the Idea of history as some realm of truth whereby the spirit of history is self-recognized within its own dialectical existence, yet Berthold-Bond interprets this as a moment in time “where spirit has fulfilled its eschatological design: the realization of its freedom and the attainment of its complete knowledge of itself.”
It is worth noting that this Christian perspective of the Hegelian historical dialectic does bear considerable resemblance with the reconciliation of history with its absolute self- knowledge, the overcoming of alienation, and the general concept of attaining an ideal.
However, while Berthold-Bond aptly points out an ambiguity central to Hegel’s historical doctrine, one should note the very obvious problem in his interpretation of Hegel’s ‘end.’ The religious perspective is not compatible with the Hegelian concept that history eventually reconciles with the Idea, whose end goal is not directed at a reconciliation with God, but something more anthropocentric and secular, and divinely intellectual. The self-realization of the historical dialectic and its existential significance is quite a departure from Berthold-Bond’s eschatological interpretation: he views the Idea as the end of human civilization, where the realization of God dismantles the entirety of our hopeless history of the world. In other words, he assimilates the concept of zeitgeist as a consummation of the infinite end of knowledge of the world with some type of prophesied armageddon. This is quite different from the Hegelian view of knowledge, as he claims that “Without Thought [history] has no objectivity; thought is its fundamental definition. The highest point of a people’s development is the rational consciousness of its life.”
From a phenomenological perspective, Berthold-Bond’s interpretation is but a mere misunderstanding; Hegel has no visions of the end of the world, but rather a view of history which eventually attains a level of self-comprehension powerful enough to sum up the truth of the world’s spirit.
Thus, the ultimate goal of history irrevocably points to the development of human consciousness, but not in a progressional or evolutionary way. Michael Forster supports this assertion in his study of Hegel’s reason in history, pushing the notion that different shapes or species of consciousness that contain distinctive “interdependent conceptions and concepts of self, objectivity, representation” emerge from the activity of the dialect and becomes characteristic of a particular period of human history. While philosophy may gravitate towards an epistemological or metaphysical analysis of the reasons why beliefs, values, and our general understanding of the universe changes in time, history is the literal representation and source of explanation for these changing forms. As Hegel’s phenomenological view of history suggests, historicity itself is a grand, threefold process of dialectical activity whereby an understanding of world history can only be accomplished through the sensitivity of historical self-consciousness. Consciousness, self-consciousness and reason as primary elements of the historical dialect are not a progressive succession, rather they are atemporal and exist within all historical epochs but as different modes of zeitgeist. Since history is evidential of these changes in the species of consciousness, Forster convincingly states that history and philosophy share the same “cognitive talents” which are crucial in our understanding of our perpetually dialectical shifts in consciousness.
Another alternative interpretation of the primal elements of the triadic dialectic that is put forth advocates the hermeneutical aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. Gallagher writes that “human consciousness consistently forgets what it has learned on the basis of its historical experience,”
insisting that forgetfulness, oblivion and recollection is the actual realized triadic historical process. In his phenomenology, Hegel often actualizes the synthesis of two opposites within dialectical structures, emphasizing the overturning and defeat of the two which perpetually seek to maintain this cyclical, eternal motion. It is interesting to note that from the hermeneutical perspective, the word being (sein) is embedded within German word for consciousness (bewubtsein), indicating the dialectically inherent relationship between the subject and object of language which is the only means to historical communication, and the process of becoming throughout historical self-consciousness. Hegel writes that the goal of history is the same goal of self-realizing consciousness: “finally, when consciousness itself grasps its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolutely knowledge itself.”
This, he claims, is the result of language and the intrinsic temporality and slipperiness it possesses. Zeigeist moves in this way as well – as the shape of consciousness adapts there is a need to cogitate, conceptualize, re-cognize – and so forth.
Thus it is clear that the relationship between philosophy and history as a means to analyzing the course of human consciousness is by no means a simple one. As posited by Hegel’s phenomenological account of consciousness and its historical nature, the triad that synthesizes consciousness, self-consciousness and reason is the same apparatus that universalizes the totality of historical thoughts from the past within the present. This is but one outlook on the philosophy of history, and while it is advantageous in universalizing the totality of history through syntheses which induction fails to grasp at, it is an interested place to further the discussion of the relation between the nature of history and the philosophical process.
Works Cited:
Barnard, F.M. Reason and Re-Enactment in History and Politics: Themes and Voices of Modernity. Québec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006.
Forster, Michael N. Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Fulbrook, Mary. Historical Theory. London: Routledge, 2002.
Gallagher, Shaun. Hegel, History and Interpretation. New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford University Press, 1977.
Hegel, G.W.F. Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Translator, Robert S. Hartman. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1997.
Inwood, Michael. Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
McCarney, Joseph. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Hegel on History. London: Routledge Press, 2000.
Nota, John H. Phenomenology and History. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1967.
O’Brien, George Dennis. Hegel on Reason and History: A Contemporary Interpretation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975.
Berthold-Bond, Daniel. “Hegel’s Eschatological Vision: Does History Have a Future?” History and Theory. Vol. 26. (February 1988): pp. 14-29
Van der Dussen, W.Jan. “Collingwood and the Idea of Progress” History and Theory. Vol 29. (1990): pp. 21-41
by Miné Salkin | Jul 12, 2007 | Uncategorized
freud: revolutionized psychoanalysis but had little science to back it up
In the selection “Medusa’s Head,” psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud fleshes out his interpretation of the mythological image as a deep-seated sexual issue, stemming from the human fear of their mother’s genitals devouring their own. In his analysis of the metaphorical representation of female genitalia, Freud sheds light onto the paradox of heterosexual male desire – a force which is both terrifying and undeniably attractive. Despite the comical effects and his persuasive argumentation, Freud’s assertions ultimately fail to explain the complexities of human sexual relations, as they gravitate around an ignorant male view of women’s sexuality.
For Freud, sex is attached to an unspoken, irrational fear of castration, where the vagina represents a vortex of simultaneous pleasure and horror. In the style of third person narrative, Freud creates a situation where the “other” is identified – in this case, the body of the female, represented by Medusa’s decapitated head is the center of alterity through the mystification of female sensuality. Instead of exploring the idea of its multiple possibilities, Freud articulates one, monolithic, uniform kind of female sexuality. From this position, Freud is failing to substantiate his arguments, as they are clearly seen to stem from impossible fears, and a blatant lack of understanding the fairer sex.
Mystifying the organs of female sexuality have both an amusing and a maddening effect – Freud attaches the fear of castration in sex to a boy’s glimpse of his own mother’s vagina. Yet where does this fear originate? Freud lacks an explanation for how anyone would even associate sexual pleasure with the possibility of losing one’s penis. Perhaps the most absurd tenet of his interpretation of Medusa is the idea that the snakes in her hair are “a confirmation of of the technical rule according to which a multiplication of penis symbols signifies castration.” The only technical rule which could be applied to Freud’s argumentation is that he defies every epistemological convention.
In short, Freud lacks understanding in the issue of sex – particularly of the female persuasion. However, his interpretation of the myth of Medusa and her sexual evaluations brings another, more philosophical issue to the surface. It is the displacement of social values which creates a dichotomy of sensuality: the ignorance towards the female body and its responses to sexual desire in turn becomes a symbol of both desire and fear, and even possibly hatred. According to Freud, the sight of Medusa’s head (and therefore the sapphic images associated with it) makes the man “stiff with terror…” yet at the same time “offers consolations… he is still in possession of a penis, and the stiffening reassures him of the fact.” This line is particularly absurd, since the spectator has an erection, how could he have ever feared for the loss of his member?
Ergo, Freud’s exploration of female sexuality through the literal and figurative interpretations of power in the myth of Medusa creates more ignorance on the topic instead of clarifying it. Even in this short selection, an envious, fearful misogyny resonates in this analysis. It is perhaps due to the social repression of women at this time in history that causes them to be “othered” to the point of being recognized as either a symbol of sexual desire, fear of castration, or both.
by Miné Salkin | Jun 14, 2007 | Uncategorized
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of cultural theory which is both evident and underlying in its nature is the investment which people create in their social spaces. According to both Foucault and Bhabha in their critical essays, human beings are made subjects of their sociocultural spaces and are inevitably constructed by these specific communities, which they perpetuate through various mediums. By looking further into Bhabha’s analysis of this social phenomenon, the difficulty of transgression is made painfully clear – since so many cultural practices become ingrained into the construction of communities, the perpetuation of these standards become overlooked themselves. On a more philosophical level, Capitalism as a global community, has created the ultimate generative existential crisis of the modern age.
the pomp and elation
One of Bhabha’s most resonating lines from her essay “On the Use and Abuse of Culture” is the perpetuation alterity and otherness across nations: “their cultural identity have become contestants in the public sphere of capitalist democracies and are embroiled in characteristic struggles for redistribution and recognition.” In this way, a new crisis of the modern age is the assimilation of cultural with economic institutions, as capitalism and the free market have paved their way as the new, dominant religion.
Clearly, the imposition of an economic infrastructure upon a cultural history does not seem at first to be an acceptable correlation, yet this coalescence of societies and capitalism has created the most fundamental existential pitfall. Similarly to Zizek’s assertion of capitalism being the seductive, yet empty promise, Bhabha articulates the “promesse du bonheur that advanced capitalism always holds… but never quite delivers.” It is merely the false idea of capitalism which lures participation, a sort of community created by the discursive address that functions in the name of “the people,” creating an ideological position for itself and enforcing those values everywhere.
This is exactly what Friedrich Nietzsche contested against in his philosophical works – that guilt and bad conscience stem from creditor and debtor relations, and that human beings fail to analyze the system which they perpetuate through their participation. It creates an undeniable monolithic binary between the creditors and the debtors, those who have, and those who do not.
The process of othering which becomes apparent in Bhabha’s analysis is the distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist nations, creating another system of binaries which human beings seem unable to resist. The problem of this is rooted in the false and highly ironical nature of capitalism – that choice is an ephemeral, illusory concept – a replacement for the Christian afterlife in a time of declining religious faith, and increasing participation in the institution of global capitalism. In this way, the Nietzschean “death of God” has an equally negative replacement: the worship of financial giants in the modern world.
by Miné Salkin | Jun 4, 2007 | Uncategorized
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of cultural theory which is both evident and underlying in its nature is the investment which people create in their social spaces. According to both Foucault and Bhabha in their critical essays, human beings are made subjects of their sociocultural spaces and are inevitably constructed by these specific communities, which they perpetuate through various mediums. By looking further into Bhabha’s analysis of this social phenomenon, the difficulty of transgression is made painfully clear – since so many cultural practices become ingrained into the construction of communities, the perpetuation of these standards become overlooked themselves. On a more philosophical level, Capitalism as a global community, has created the ultimate generative existential crisis of the modern age.
One of Bhabha’s most resonating lines from her essay “On the Use and Abuse of Culture” is the perpetuation alterity and otherness across nations: “their cultural identity have become contestants in the public sphere of capitalist democracies and are embroiled in characteristic struggles for redistribution and recognition.” In this way, a new crisis of the modern age is the assimilation of cultural with economic institutions, as capitalism and the free market have paved their way as the new, dominant religion.
Clearly, the imposition of an economic infrastructure upon a cultural history does not seem at first to be an acceptable correlation, yet this coalescence of societies and capitalism has created the most fundamental existential pitfall. Similarly to Zizek’s assertion of capitalism being the seductive, yet empty promise, Bhabha articulates the “promesse du bonheur that advanced capitalism always holds… but never quite delivers.” It is merely the false idea of capitalism which lures participation, a sort of community created by the discursive address that functions in the name of “the people,” creating an ideological position for itself and enforcing those values everywhere.
This is exactly what Friedrich Nietzsche contested against in his philosophical works – that guilt and bad conscience stem from creditor and debtor relations, and that human beings fail to analyze the system which they perpetuate through their participation. It creates an undeniable monolithic binary between the creditors and the debtors, those who have, and those who do not.
The process of othering which becomes apparent in Bhabha’s analysis is the distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist nations, creating another system of binaries which human beings seem unable to resist. The problem of this is rooted in the false and highly ironical nature of capitalism – that choice is an ephemeral, illusory concept – a replacement for the Christian afterlife in a time of declining religious faith, and increasing participation in the institution of global capitalism. In this way, the Nietzschean “death of God” has an equally negative replacement: the worship of financial giants in the modern world.
by Miné Salkin | May 13, 2007 | Uncategorized
I just finished reading a very interesting essay called “Is There a Queer Pedagogy? Or, Stop Reading Straight” by Deborah P. Britzman. Modern Critical Theory has never been so good…
the three sexes
The concept of disavowing is traditionally viewed as an internalized, yet conscious denial of responsibility or weighing the value of an idea or concept. Indeed, the essence of disavowal lies within the paradoxical idea that although certain thoughts and situations are widely accepted as “being wrong” in political, social or moral senses, the act of disavowal itself is a silent confirmation of the socially constructed axioms.
For Deborah Britzman, the concept of disavowal in Queer Pedagogy is an extremely complicated issue due to its social, historical, and philosophic integrity. In her essay, Briztman fleshes out the discontinuity of pedagogy in relation to the “crucial cultural and historical changes that concern the constitution of bodies of knowledge and knowledge of bodies.”1 According to her argument, Queer Theory acts against the altruistic human inclination to disavow certain kinds of knowledge simply because they defy the social and cultural conventions, which are perpetually changing.
Namely, the act of disavowal attempts to deconstruct the definitive binaries which social institutions gravitate towards. As listed in the essay, “categories like masculinity, femininity, sexuality”2 form the basis of education and the pedagogical canon which become accepted due to varying sociopolitical and cultural variables. Furthermore, the pedagogical account of knowledge fails to unify, and instead becomes divisive in its assertions of normalcy and the articulation of what the majority of society believes is “heterosexual.” Although Queer Theory is not an exploration in deviant sexuality, the example of the binaries established by defining sexuality are extremely significant in the analysis of disavowal, since these binaries are essentially universally accepted on an ontological basis.
Going beyond the theoretical significance of disavowal, the object of Queer Theory becomes self-refuting immediately after it has been put into motion. In order for the disavowal of present binaries and cultural misconceptions, the object of defying such socially relevant issues becomes a living paradox when taken to absurd lengths. For example, to break the cycle of disavowing or becoming complacent with present social mores, Queer Theory demands a constant, perpetual turning over of new ideals. In this sense, the goal of Queer Theory reduces itself to a theoretical absurdity: it requires the constant shifting of new values within the pedagogical system, yet where exactly does the significance lie in creating new perspectives?
Thus the goal of Queer Theory is an ironic one – it merely preserves the Nietzschean “reversal of perspectives” to the point where it becomes a foil to nihilism. As Queer Theory rejects preexisting binaries, it invents another one by defining itself on the fringes of what is culturally accepted – thus being inherently paradoxical.
